

Data Protection and Security Issues With Network Error Logging

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Abstract: Network Error Logging helps web server operators detect operational problems in real-time to provide fast and reliable services. This paper analyses Network Error Logging from two angles. Firstly, this paper overviews Network Error Logging from the data protection view. The ePrivacy Directive requires consent for non-essential access to the end devices. Nevertheless, the Network Error Logging design does not allow limiting the tracking to consenting users. Other issues lay in GDPR requirements for transparency and the obligations in the contract between controllers and processors of personal data. Secondly, this paper explains Network Error Logging exploitations to deploy long-time trackers to the victim devices. Even though users should be able to disable Network Error Logging, it is not clear how to do so. Web server operators can mitigate the attack by configuring servers to preventively remove policies that adversaries might have added.

1 INTRODUCTION

Web server operators need to monitor their servers for availability, which is a crucial success factor (Franke, 2012). Network Error Logging (NEL) (W3C, 2021) detects failures in the reachability of web servers, including failures during domain name resolution (Burnett et al., 2020). Each HTTP server can employ each visiting browser¹ for NEL by adding a NEL header into the HTTP reply. Consequently, the web server operator can learn about future failed attempts of the browser to reach the web server. NEL also allows to report of successful visits and provides a fallback mechanism for unreachable logging servers.

The current NEL editor’s standard draft (W3C, 2021) covers various privacy implications of NEL. For example, an attacker can distribute unique reporting URLs for each user; consequently, NEL can be misused as a supercookie. The paper describing NEL (Burnett et al., 2020) provides four security, privacy, and ethical principles: (1) NEL logs existing in-


formation in a different place, (2) NEL logs only requests users voluntarily make, (3) end users can opt out of NEL, and (4) third parties must not be able to use NEL to monitor sites they do not control.


This paper has two goals. Firstly, we go through the law requirements of NEL in the European Economic Area (EEA) and show that web server operators should seek consent from users before installing NEL policies to browsers. Secondly, we review the security, privacy, and ethical expectations of the original NEL paper (Burnett et al., 2020) and check their correctness from the user’s perspective.

This paper has several contributions:

1. We are the first to analyze NEL law requirements in EEA.
2. We provide arguments disputing the security, privacy, and ethical expectation of NEL authors (Burnett et al., 2020) not covered by the current NEL editor’s standard draft (W3C, 2021).
3. We are first to suggest that web server operators that do not deploy NEL should configure their servers to remove policies that adversaries might have added. (Jeřábek and Polčák, 2023) revealed only a few domains removing NEL, so such configuration is not deployed in the wild.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains how NEL works. Section 3 overviews related

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¹At the time of the writing of this paper, Chromium-based browsers like Google Chrome, Chrome for Android, Microsoft Edge, Opera, and Opera GF support NEL. Brave is the only Chromium-based browser that we discovered does not support NEL.

work. Section 4 analyzes the requirements stemming from the EEA law. Section 5 disputes the security, privacy, and ethical expectation of NEL. Section 6 discusses the implications of the results of this paper. Section 7 concludes this paper.

2 NEL BACKGROUND

NEL was introduced by researchers mostly affiliated with Google (Burnett et al., 2020). The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is in the process of standardizing NEL (W3C, 2021). NEL introduces NEL HTTP header sent by an HTTP server that contains the NEL policy of the server. In addition, Report-To HTTP header determines web servers that collect NEL reports for the visited domain.

The goal of NEL is to let web server operators instruct their visitors to report failures in attempting to visit the service as well as successful visits. A web server operator can control the fraction of failures (*failure_fraction*) and success reports (*success_fraction*), and other parameters in a NEL policy. The policy is valid for a limited time (*max_age* parameter of a policy). By default, the policy applies to the visited domains, but a server can also instruct the clients to apply the policy to subdomains (*include_subdomains* parameter of a policy).

A NEL collector can deploy NEL on its own. Hence, once a browser learns the NEL policy of a domain and sends a report, it learns the NEL policy of the collector (if deployed). Reports about the collector are called meta reports (Burnett et al., 2020).

Figure 1 shows an example of a NEL report. The client reports the age of the error (the browser often sends messages with a delay) and its type. Additionally, the report contains other information about the event so that an operator can react to the message.

Browsers store only the last policy retrieved for each domain.

3 RELATED WORK

(Jeřábek and Polčák, 2023) analyze HTTP Archive in a longitudinal study. 11.73% (almost 2,250,000 unique domains) deployed NEL in February 2023. Cloudflare is the largest NEL provider according to the study. To our best knowledge, all other papers concerning NEL utilize NEL as a tool. This paper is the first that puts the NEL design decisions under scrutiny. Nevertheless, the privacy considerations of the current NEL editor’s standard draft (W3C, 2021) cover several issues that this paper does not repeat.

```
{
  "age": 0,
  "type": "network-error",
  "url": "https://www.example.com/",
  "body": {
    "sampling_fraction": 0.5,
    "referrer": "http://example.com/",
    "server_ip": "2001:DB8:0:0:0:0:42",
    "protocol": "h2",
    "method": "GET",
    "request_headers": {},
    "response_headers": {},
    "status_code": 200,
    "elapsed_time": 823,
    "phase": "application",
    "type": "http.protocol.error"
  }
}
```

Figure 1: An example of a NEL report (W3C, 2021).

Online tracking is omnipresent (Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2011; Mayer and Mitchell, 2012; Acar et al., 2020; Information Commissioner’s Office, 2019). Cookies holding unique identifiers may be accompanied or replaced with ETags and other tracking mechanisms like browser fingerprinting (Mayer and Mitchell, 2012). Indeed, NEL can be misused for online tracking as covered by the privacy considerations of the current NEL editor’s standard draft (W3C, 2021).

The original request-response nature of HTTP has already been accompanied by other techniques that allow browsers to communicate with servers without any explicit user action initiating such communication. For example, Push API (W3C, 2022b) allows a previously visited server to push a message without the user needing to open the web page in the browser. Nevertheless, the user must consent to allow a site to access Push API. Hyperlink auditing² allows web page creators to force the browser to report that the user clicked a link.

Previous research shows that 48–75% of websites unintentionally leak identifiers and other private information in URLs (Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2011; Mayer and Mitchell, 2012). A NEL report contains both the URL of the previously visited page (*referrer*) and the page just visited (success) or broken page (error report), *url*. As *Referer* HTTP header leaks the previously visited web page URL, NEL would log the same information as detected by (Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2011). Nevertheless, the *Referer* header already went through scrutiny,

²<https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/links.html#hyperlink-auditing>

and web pages can regulate the content of the header³. NEL applies the same restrictions to the referrer field as the `Referer` header (W3C, 2021).

An adversary with access to the communication channel between a web visitor and a web server accessed by the visitor can deploy a Man In The Middle (MitM) attack (Conti et al., 2016). As NEL can be deployed only on TLS channels (W3C, 2021; Burnett et al., 2020), an adversary would need to spoof a valid certificate (Conti et al., 2016), hope that the victim ignores the error (Sunshine et al., 2009; Raman et al., 2020), exploit a broken implementation (Stricot-Tarboton et al., 2016), or remove the encryption (Li et al., 2018). Section 6 builds on the idea that MitM attacks appear in practice.

4 LAW ANALYSIS

In EEA, ePrivacy Directive regulates publicly available services and networks (The European Parliament and The Council of the European Union, 2002; The European Parliament and The Council of the European Union, 2009; van Hoboken and Zuiderveen Borgesius, 2015). *"Article 5(3) applies to anyone that stores or accesses information, such as a cookie, on a user's device, including if no personal data are involved."* (van Hoboken and Zuiderveen Borgesius, 2015) Article 29 Working Party (WP29) also considers ePrivacy Directive to apply to different technologies, not only cookies (WP29, 2012, Introduction). In essence, Article 5(3) allows only strictly necessary access to the user's terminal device or the access is needed to carry the communication (WP29, 2012). Specifically, the necessity needs to be viewed from the point of the *user*, not the service provider (WP29, 2012, Section 5).

Additionally, when personal data are processed, GDPR (The European Parliament and The Council of the European Union, 2016) regulates the processing unless ePrivacy Directive overrides the specific provisions (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2021, Recital 74).

NEL requires storing policies in the browser (W3C, 2021, Process policy headers, step 14). Hence, ePrivacy Directive applies. Although web server operators view NEL as beneficial (Burnett et al., 2020), it is not strictly necessary from the point of the user. One of the four principles of NEL is that the user can opt out of NEL at any time (Burnett et al., 2020, Section 3.2, point 3). (Jeřábek and Polčák, 2023) show that most web servers do not need NEL to

function. Consequently, neither of the two exceptions of the ePrivacy Directive applies. Hence, obtaining consent is necessary before installing a NEL policy. As the current NEL implementations do not obtain consent (Burnett et al., 2020; W3C, 2021), the site operator have to find another way to seek consent before adding NEL headers to its replies.

Additionally, the information reported by NEL can consist of personal data:

1. Personal data can be embedded in URLs (Krishnamurthy and Wills, 2011; Mayer and Mitchell, 2012; Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés, 2022; The Office for Personal Data Protection, 2021). Although the original NEL paper expects that NEL reports do not contain URL parameters (Burnett et al., 2020, Section 3.4), such a requirement is missing in the current NEL editor's standard draft (W3C, 2021). Our experiments confirm that current Google Chrome reports the URL parameters in NEL reports.
2. A dynamic IP address is personal data if there is a mechanism that identifies the person behind the IP address (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2016). Up to 60–70% of HTTP user-agent strings (UAS) can accurately identify hosts in some datasets, and the number rises to 80% when augmented with an IP address (Yen et al., 2012). Note that the UAS research (Yen et al., 2012) is old, and today numbers are likely lower as browser vendors limit the information in UASes. Even so, later research revealed a long tail of UASes that may reveal users (Kline et al., 2017).
3. The latest NEL editor's standard draft (W3C, 2021) allows operators to request embedding additional headers in NEL reports by signaling optional `request_headers` and `response_headers` policy members. Personal data can be a part of additional HTTP headers reported to the server, such as ETag (Mayer and Mitchell, 2012), if the original server employs such headers for tracking.

Whenever the information collected by NEL consists of personal data, the operator of the original sever needs to apply additional provisions stemming from GDPR, like the principle of data minimization, transparency, and accountability. For example, the minimization principle requires personal data to be *adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed* (The European Parliament and The Council of the European Union, 2016, Art. 5(1)(c)). As the original paper did not find much use in reporting URL paths (Burnett et al., 2020, Section 3.4), the controller

³https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Referer_header:_privacy_and_security_concerns

processing URLs with personal data by NEL would have hard-time defending the necessity and relevancy of the processing.

Moreover, the NEL collector operator needs to follow the rules for processors or joint controllers, including accepting a legal contract. As the NEL collector can deploy its own NEL policy, operators of the NEL meta report collectors are also processors or joint controllers of the original web server (European Data Protection Board, 2021) as they process the IP addresses of the users (Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, 2022; Court of Justice of the European Union, 2016). Hence, they need to conclude a legal contract as well.

The processors or joint contollership brings further obstacles to the operators of collectors that add NEL headers. Consider that a group of distinct web servers share a single collector *C* that adds a NEL header. Furthermore, suppose that the visitor already reported from web server *A* to *C*, so the NEL policy for *C* to report to *C'* is already installed in the browser. Later, the same visitor visits *B* and installs the NEL policy from *B* to report to *C*. Afterwards, both *B* and *C* become inaccessible. Consequently, the browser will report an error to *C'*. Figure 2 shows the communication diagram.




Figure 2: The browser reports an error of *C*.

However, as the browser learned the policy for *C* through communication with *A*, both *A* and *B* need to share the same joint controllers and processors. That is indeed legal. However, both *A* and *B* must have the possibility to remove processors or joint controllers from the processing chain (European Data Protection Board, 2023). Technically, different chains of collectors can be formed by operating the collectors for *A* and *B* with different domain names; for example, *A.C.example* and *B.C.example*. The downside of such an approach is that the browser cannot learn the collector of *B.C.example* through interaction with *A* and its collectors, see Figure 3. Consequently, should web server *B* and its collector *B.C.example* not be accessible simultaneously (modified scenario from above in Figure 3), the browser would not report the problem with *B.C.example*.

Articles 12-14 of GDPR list requirements on the information that a data controller should reveal to




Figure 3: The browser cannot report an error of *B.C.example*.

each data subject before the data processing starts or in a reasonable time afterwards. Processing in the scope of ePrivacy Directive yields the same requirements on transparency (ePrivacy Art. 5(3), GDPR Art. 94(2)). Hence, each controller employing NEL needs to reveal transparent information about data collection, for example, in the privacy policy.

5 NEL SECURITY, PRIVACY, AND ETHICS ANALYSIS

The original NEL paper (Burnett et al., 2020, Section 3.2) explains four security, privacy, and ethical principles. This section disputes the NEL design and argues that the principles are not fulfilled. Furthermore, the current NEL editor’s standard draft (W3C, 2021) does not remedy the finding of this section.

5.1 Can NEL Data Leak to Third Parties?

Principle 1 establishes that NEL stores existing information in a different place. NEL policy determines the storage. The 4th principle expects that third parties must not monitor users through NEL. Hence, third parties should not be able to install their collectors. Nevertheless, the same paper (Burnett et al., 2020, Section 3.3) warns that the assumption holds only without any tampering with the certificate validation mechanism. The paper rightly points out that an adversary having the power to circumvent the validation mechanism can tamper with the HTTP data by other means, for example, by injecting additional JavaScript.

However, the original paper, as well as the current NEL editor’s standard draft (W3C, 2021), does not highlight the persistence of the NEL policy. The injection capabilities of the adversary are effective only during the time that the adversary is in the MitM position. Although the browser can cache the malicious content and the JavaScript injection attack can be ef-

fective some time after the adversary leaves the MitM position, the cached content is likely to be replaced by updates on the server or evicted due to the limited size of the cache.

Nevertheless, adversaries with the ability to insert their JavaScript code can also deploy Service Workers (W3C, 2022a) that can act as a proxy between the visited page and its server. However, the scope of Service Workers is limited to subpaths of the path where their worker script is located. Consequently, a Service Worker sees all requests and replies of the subpath on the web server, can initiate requests, and can influence the content of the replies.

Similarly, a NEL policy stays on the device for the whole duration specified by the policy unless replaced by a new policy sent by the server. The current NEL editor’s standard draft (W3C, 2021) does not limit the maximal duration of the policy, so it can effectively be installed for eternity (for example, hundreds of years). For domains that do not signal NEL, the maliciously installed policy would be removed only when the user clears data stored in the browser. Unlike Service Workers, NEL policies do not have scope limitations.

Neither the original paper nor the current NEL editor’s standard draft (W3C, 2021) consider adversaries that appear on a minority of web servers that allow users to inject their content, like blogs or personal web pages. For example, such a user can create their content on a specific URL path on the server. Some of these servers allow users to modify HTTP headers. Such *rogue content creators* can deploy NEL (as well as Service Workers) on their part of the web server.

A naïve assumption is that NEL does not increase the powers of an adversary and only brings an additional tool. However, we identified three scenarios where NEL creates additional risks compared with Service Workers:

- A NEL policy applies to all pages on the domain that deploys NEL (and possibly subdomains). In contrast, the scope of Service Worker is limited. Hence, NEL increases the powers of *rogue content creators* that control only limited paths on the server as their NEL collector would see all browsing activities of the visitors with the web server after their visit of the malicious part of the web server. In contrast, Service Worker would only see HTTP traffic concerning the subpath of the web server.
- Some browser extensions block JavaScript or Service Workers (Polčák et al., 2023; Michael Schwarz and Gruss, 2018)⁴. We tested

⁴For example, Google Store reports that

NoScript 11.4.16 in Chrome, and the extension does not block NEL. Consequently, NEL allows adversaries like TLS MitM proxies and rogue content creators to sniff on traffic of users protected from Service Workers.

- Suppose that an adversary finds a bug that allows to inject HTTP headers and, thus, NEL headers. Even if a single page on a domain was affected by such a bug, the adversary would be able to monitor the traffic of the visitors of the vulnerable page on the whole domain and its subdomains. Note that the hypothetical bug does not require that the attacker has the ability to run JavaScript code in the visiting browsers that is needed to install Service Workers.

Neither the original paper nor the current NEL editor’s standard draft (W3C, 2021) discuss such or similar scenarios.

Web server operators that deploy NEL do not suffer from the risk as the legitimate policy replaces the malicious policy during the next visit. We recommend that other web server operators add policies with `max_age=0`. The duration of 0 forces the browser to remove any previously stored NEL policy for the domain, including the policies adversaries may have inserted in the past. (Jeřábek and Polčák, 2023) reports less than ten domains removing NEL policies in each analyzed year, so we conclude that we are the first to promote the advice publicly.

We believe that signalling NEL policy removal does not trigger the legal issues identified in Section 4 with NEL in EEA, as the recommended policy would not remove any NEL policy under normal circumstances. Hence, ePrivacy Article 5(3) would not be triggered. A malicious policy would not be requested by the user, so it is not necessary to provide the service. As the web server operator has to process personal data securely (GDPR, Art. 32), ensuring that browsing history does not leak to an adversary is in the spirit of the law.

5.2 Does NEL Provide Data Only When Users Voluntarily Access The Service?

A user or a network operator can deploy DNS firewall, for example, by changing the *host* file or the local DNS resolver (Špaček et al., 2019). Consequently, the DNS firewall returns invalid IP addresses for domain queries of the blocked domains. So, for exam-

more than 100,000 users installed NoScript (<https://chrome.google.com/webstore/detail/noscript/doojmbjmlfjnbmnoijecmcbfeoakpjm>).

ple, if a web page A includes content from a blocked domain D , the browser cannot access the server of D as the DNS returns an invalid IP address.

However, NEL policies installed before the deployment of such a DNS firewall stay in place. Hence, the browser would report to the collector of the blocked domain (if the collector is not also blocked) that the IP address of the server changed, the IP address to which the DNS firewall remaps the domain, and the IP address of the computer running behind the DNS firewall.

We argue that the user or the operator that deployed the DNS firewall took active measures against accessing the blocked domains. Despite this, NEL reveals the DNS firewall to the blocked party.

Another scenario where NEL can be exploited to report to services that users do not access voluntarily is online advertisement. Some data protection authorities (Information Commissioner’s Office, 2019) report that people are often not aware of the queries of their browsers interacting with online advertisement business. Suppose that one of these companies deploys NEL. We argue that if the data protection authorities claim that the online advertisement processing is “*disproportionate, intrusive, and unfair*” (Information Commissioner’s Office, 2019), users do not voluntarily access such services. Hence, in this scenario, NEL would track HTTP services that the users are unaware of and thus do not access voluntarily.

5.3 Can End Users Opt Out of NEL?

Both the original NEL paper (Burnett et al., 2020) and the current NEL editor’s standard draft (W3C, 2021) expect that the users can opt out of NEL. However, we cannot find any option to disable NEL in Google Chrome 110 either in settings or in `chrome://flags`, even though we went through the settings option-by-option. Moreover, we tried to seek help from Google Search. However, the engine did not return any result for queries “*chrome disable network error logging*” and “*chrome disable nel*” neither on the whole web nor on `stackoverflow.com`; for each query, we went through the first 50 results offered by the search engine. Even more, we asked a long-term Chrome user who is a Ph.D. student of IT to help us. He was not able to deactivate NEL during 15 minutes of active trying.

We argue that if Chrome offers a setting to disable NEL, it is hidden and cannot be easily located by regular users.

6 DISCUSSION

This section discusses the results of this paper.

6.1 A Ticking Data Protection Bomb

(Jeřábek and Polčák, 2023) report that more than 11.7% of domains deploy NEL. Yet, Section 4 argues that users in EEA need to consent to NEL. Consequently, the operators of the web servers deploying NEL may be in conflict with the law. However, the number of 11.7% is an upper bound. Not all of the domains are in the scope of the ePrivacy Directive. Additionally, previous work (Trevisan et al., 2019) shows a heterogeneous implementation of the ePrivacy Directive by the EU (European Union) member states. Hence, some operators in the EU might not violate the law due to the incorrect implementation of the ePrivacy Directive in their state.

The plan is to replace ePrivacy Directive with a Regulation⁵. Initially, the plan was to replace the Directive on the same day as GDPR entered into force. Yet, as of the writing of this paper in February 2023, the final text of the new Regulation is not known. Neither the text proposed by The European Commission nor the proposed amendments by The European Parliament (EP) change the requirement for consent to store NEL policy in a browser. However, The Council of the European Union (Council) version provides amendment Article 8(1)(da) that would allow using storage capabilities of terminal equipment to detect technical faults for the duration necessary.

The authors of this paper interpret the Council Article 8(1)(da) as allowing NEL policies with 0 success fraction, provided that the operator erases the logged data when each failure is detected and mitigated.

As of the time of the writing of this text, it is not clear if an exception like the Council Article 8(1)(da) propagates to the final ePrivacy Regulation. Once the Council and the EP agree on the final text of the Regulation, there should be a 2-year transition period before the new Regulation takes effect.

6.2 Cloudflare

Cloudflare is the largest NEL collector provider (Jeřábek and Polčák, 2023). Let us focus on their data protection information.

The public information on NEL support is confusing. The *Get started guide* looks like the web op-

⁵See the procedure and related documents at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/HIS/?uri=CELEX:52017PC0010>

erators need to explicitly enable NEL⁶. However, on another page, Cloudflare informs its customers that they “can opt out of having their end users consume the NEL headers by emailing Cloudflare support”⁷. Some customers report that they cannot see NEL analytics on their dashboard⁸. The customers speculate that Cloudflare uses NEL data internally.

Cloudflare stores IP addresses only in volatile memory to estimate the physical and network location of the user and determine if the user changed the IP address recently⁹. It seems that Cloudflare interprets the law that the volatility of the storage means that it does not process personal data. However, the French data protection authority (Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, 2022) recently treated IP addresses in Google Analytics as personal data. Even though Google Analytics trims the addresses shortly after the arrival, there is a period when full addresses are available, and consequently, personal data are processed.

If Cloudflare enabled NEL without the awareness of their customers, Cloudflare would be guilty of breaching the ePrivacy Directive and likely breaching GDPR Art. 28(3)(a) as it processes personal data without such instructions of the controller during processing that is in the scope of the supposedly breached EEA law.

An analysis of other NEL players’ data protection issues is out of the scope of this paper as each deployment needs to be analyzed individually. Furthermore, we are not Cloudflare customers, so the data protection analysis did not consider information agreed upon between Cloudflare and its customers, like the contracts.

7 CONCLUSION

Error monitoring is a crucial activity of web server operators. Even though Chromium-based browsers have supported NEL for several years, the ongoing NEL standardization received little academic scrutiny. To our best knowledge, neither the European Data Protection Board nor its predecessor WP29 issued any opinion or guidelines about NEL.

This paper identified several NEL deficiencies from the European data protection view. First of all,

⁶<https://developers.cloudflare.com/network-error-logging/get-started/>

⁷<https://support.cloudflare.com/hc/en-us/articles/360050691831-Understanding-Network-Error-Logging>

⁸<https://community.cloudflare.com/t/access-to-network-error-logging/472139>

⁹See footnote 7.

the authors of this paper interpret the law as requiring consent before an operator can install a NEL policy. However, NEL is supposed to be opt-out (Burnett et al., 2020; W3C, 2021), so there is no built-in way to seek consent (opt-in). Moreover, web operators need to be cautious about personal data reported by NEL as they trigger additional requirements on data minimization, transparency, and accountability.

Although the security, privacy, and ethics analysis of the original paper (Burnett et al., 2020) supposes that NEL data cannot leak to third parties, NEL provides data only when users voluntarily access the service, and end users can opt out of NEL, our paper provides counter-arguments explaining that the expectations are not valid in all cases. Most strikingly, we failed to opt out of NEL in Chrome.

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